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VAT EXPERIMENTATION – NEW YORK & ILLINOIS
Richard T. Ainsworth
US States are experimenting with VATs to solve market-specific problems with
tax compliance and revenue yields. Experimentation has been going on for years.
Sometimes the experiment is a success; at other times it needs more work.
Although not called VATs either before, during or after adoption – that is what
these experiments are. Market-specific VATs are producing benefits long promoted by
VAT advocates, notably:
 an increase in revenue without an increase in tax rates,
 increased administrative efficiency without significant costs to business,
 more stable deposits from fractionated payments, and
 lower enforcement costs from the self-enforcing nature of the VAT.
There are strong technical disadvantages to the adoption of a VAT as a general
proposition, most of which flow from efforts to make the VAT work well in multijurisdictional settings, but the market-specific approach to VAT adoption in the US
minimizes these drawbacks. This is what makes the US experiments so interesting.
For analytical purposes it is easier to anticipate problems and to take corrective
actions if we admit that what we are dealing with is a VAT (even if some do not want to
call it that for political reasons). This paper takes two examples of US VATs, the New
York VAT in hotel accommodations, and the Illinois VAT in the retail gasoline market,
contrasts them, and shows what works and what does not.
NEW YORK’S VAT
On August 13, 2010 the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance,
Office of Tax Policy Analysis, Taxpayer Guidance Division released Amendments
Affecting the Application of Sales Tax to Rent Received for Hotel Occupancy by Room
Remarketers.1 The legislative revision it considers effectively converted New York’s
Hotel Room Occupancy Tax from a single-stage retail sales tax to multi-stage Europeanstyle VAT.
In the normal case, when a final consumer secures a room directly from a hotel, a
retail sales tax is easy to apply. The consumer pays tax to the operator of the hotel based
on the value paid for the accommodations. A retail sales tax “fits” this fact pattern very
well.
However, when an intermediary is interposed between the final consumer and the
hotel what was formerly a single-stage transaction now becomes multi-staged. A short
commercial supply chain is created, and value is added at each stage. Stated another
way, the hotel (like a manufacturer) produces inventory each day (vacant rooms).
1

TSB-M-10(10)S (August 13, 2010) available at: http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/memos/sales/m10_10s.pdf.
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Unfilled rooms are perishable commodities. As the time for occupancy comes
closer a certain number of these rooms will be sold (at a discount) to middleman (room
remarketers) who will add important value (renting the room on short notice). The best
middlemen possess what is known as “demand collection systems” to find willing renters
on short notice.2 A value added tax “fits” this kind of supply chain very well.
Operator. The same problem that New York faced with its Hotel Room
Occupancy Tax is replicated in many hotel taxes throughout the US. These taxes are
modeled on a retail sales tax, and they pivot on the requirement that the operator3 (like a
retail merchant) must collect the tax from an occupant (assumed to be a final consumer).
Prior to the passage of Chapter 57 of the Laws of 2010 New York defined an operator as:
“Any person operating a hotel.”4
New York only had to look to North Carolina to see what would happen if it tried
to require a virtual intermediary (room reseller) to collect the Hotel Room Occupancy
Tax on the value they were adding to the final sale. Pitt County, North Carolina brought
such a suit alleging violation of its Occupancy Tax. The case was removed to federal
court and quickly dismissed.5 The Fourth Circuit that agreed with the dismissal.6
The key to both decisions is the term operator. The essential argument is: if a
business is a retailer (a hotel operator) under the North Carolina sales tax, and if that
business rents accommodations within Pitt County, then Pitt County should be able to
require that business to collect the Pitt County Occupancy Tax. But, online travel
companies are not “retailers,” because they do not operate hotels. Thus, Pitt County
cannot compel them to collect tax on their room re-sales.
The Fourth Circuit simply held that online businesses with no physical presence
in North Carolina are not subject to the sales tax. They are not “retailers” within the
meaning of the sales tax.7 Thus, the Fourth Circuit stated:
… an online travel company is not a retailer because it is not a business of
a type that is similar to a hotel, motel, or tourist home or camp. As a
result, an online travel company is not subject to the Pitt County
occupancy tax.8
Rather than fight this battle,9 New York has decided to change the definition of an
operator in Chapter 57 of the Laws of 2010. The expanded definition now includes room
remarketers.10 It states that an operator is:
2

Jay Walker, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
New York Tax Law §1105(e).
4
New York Tax Law §1101(c)(4).
5
Pitt County, N.C. v. Hotels.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85910 (E.D.N.C., Aug. 12, 2007).
6
Pitt County, N.C. v. Hotels.com, 553 F.3rd 308 (4th Cir., 2009).
7
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(3).
8
Pitt County, 553 F.3rd 308, 314.
9
In fact, the State of New York had an inkling of how difficult litigation would be on this issue, because
Nassau County had unsuccessfully tried to bring a class action suit against many of the virtual
3
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Any person operating a hotel. Such term shall include a room remarketer
and such room remarketer shall be deemed to operate a hotel, or portion
thereof, with respect to which such person has the rights of a room
remarketer.11
This solves the problem. Both the owner of the hotel and the virtual intermediary
(room remarketers) are operators. Both the virtual intermediary and the guest are
occupants.12 Thus, for example, if a room that normally lists for $100 is sold to a virtual
intermediary for $50, and then resold to a guest for $70 the tax will be collected twice.
The virtual intermediary (as an occupant) will pay the hotel owner (as an operator) a tax
on $50. In addition, the guest (as an occupant) will pay the virtual intermediary (as an
operator) a tax on $70.
If this was all there was to the change, then it is clear that New York would be
going too far. Where New York may have previously collected tax only on $50, it would
now collect tax on $120 ($50 + $70 = $120). This aggregate tax base exceeds the $100
value of the room by $20.
New York solves this problem by following the lead of the EU VAT. It allows
the virtual intermediary a credit for the full amount of the tax it has paid against the tax it
collects from the guest.
Room remarketers. A carrot and stick is applied to virtual intermediaries under
the amendments to the Hotel Room Occupancy Tax. Not only is the virtual intermediary
intermediaries. County of Nassau, NY v. Hotels.com et. al. 594 F. Supp. 2d 251 (E.D.N.Y., 2007) (case
dismissed because the county did not exhaust administrative remedies); County of Nassau, NY v.
Hotels.com et. al. 577 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir., 2009) (vacated and remanded for failure to meet requirements for
class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 because it is not clear that all the members of the class imposed
a hotel tax that was similar to the Nassau County hotel tax).
10
A room remarketer is defined in New York Tax Law §1101(c)(8), effective September 1, 2010 as:
A person who reserves, arranges for, conveys, or furnishes occupancy, whether directly
or indirectly, to an occupant for rent in an amount determined by the room remarketer,
directly or indirectly, whether pursuant to a written or other agreement. Such person's
ability or authority to reserve, arrange for, convey, or furnish occupancy, directly or
indirectly, and to determine rent therefor, shall be the "Rights of a room remarketer". A
room remarketer is not a permanent resident with respect to a room for which such
person has the rights of a room remarketer.
11
New York Tax Law §1101(c)(4), effective September 1, 2010.
12
In an abundance of caution, New York also modified the definition of occupant. Prior to Chapter 57 of
the Laws of 2010 an occupant was defined as:
A person who, for a consideration, uses, possesses, or has the right to use or possess, any
room in a hotel under any lease, concession, permit, right of access, license to use or
other agreement, or otherwise.
After Chapter 57 of the Laws of 2010 an occupant is defined as:
A person who, for a consideration, uses, possesses, or has the right to use or possess,
any room in a hotel under any lease, concession, permit, right of access, license to use
or other agreement, or otherwise. "Right to use or possess" includes the rights of a room
remarketer as described in paragraph eight of this subdivision.
Thus, a room remarketer (virtual intermediary) is an occupant of a New York room when it acquires the
right to “use or possess” the room it re-sells to the eventual guest.
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(room remarketer) deemed to be an operator (required to collect the tax from the guest it
resells to) but it is allowed a credit for the full amount of the tax it has paid to the owner
of the hotel in its capacity as an occupant of the same room. This is precisely how the
EU VAT operates.
A simple example using a 10% tax rate is helpful. If a virtual intermediary
secures a room in New York for $50 that it resells to a guest for $70, it would: (a) pay a
tax of $5 to the hotel owner, (b) collect a tax of $7 from the guest, and then (c) deduct the
$5 it paid from the $7 it collected and remit $2 with its return. In this manner the correct
amount of tax ($7) is remitted on the true consumption base ($70). However, it is
remitted in slices ($5 from the hotel owner, and $2 from the virtual intermediary).
Room remarketers must register, and receive a certificate of authority number.13
Returns are due quarterly.14 Only registered operators qualify for a refund or credit of
taxes paid, and they must furnish their certificate of authority number and the number of
the operator of the hotel to whom they paid tax.15 An application for credit or refund is
filed using Form AU-11, Application for Credit or Refund of Sales or Use Tax.16 Just as
under the EU VAT room remarketers are allowed to immediately take the credit for the
tax paid (to the hotel operator) on the return where they report the amounts they have
collected from the guest. The tax remitted is a net amount.
If an application for credit has been filed, the room remarketer may
immediately take the credit on the return that is due coincident with the
application for credit, or immediately after the room remarketer files the
application for credit. However, the taking of the credit on the return is
deemed to be part of the application for credit.17
Thus, just as under the EU VAT,18 a room remarketer in New York remits tax
based on the value it has added to the supply. The remarketer’s base is the full amount
charged to its customer (not merely the amount for the accommodation), and will include
any mark-up added by the remarketer.19
13

New York Tax Law §1134(a)(1), effective September 1, 2010. This is equivalent to the requirement
under the EU VAT that a taxable person must register [VAT DIRECTIVE, ART. 9(1)], and receive a VAT
identification number [VAT ID] [VAT DIRECTIVE, ART. 214]. The SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE of 17 May
1977on the harmonization of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover tax – Common system of
value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (77/388/EEC) 1977 O.J. (L 145) 1 was repealed and replaced
on November 28, 2006 with the RECAST VAT DIRECTIVE. Council Directive 2006/112/EC on the Common
system of value added tax, O.J. (L 347) 1. Citation throughout this document will be referenced VAT
DIRECTIVE.
14
New York Tax Law §1136(a)(1).
15
TSB-M-10(10)S at 2. A similar requirement to identify taxable persons by VAT ID numbers on invoices
is found under VAT DIRECTIVE, ART. 22(3).
16
Available at: http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/current_forms/st/au11_fill_in.pdf
17
TSB-M-10(10)S (August 13, 2010) at 2.
18
VAT DIRECTIVE, ART. 206.
19
New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, Office of Tax Policy Analysis, Taxpayer Guidance
Division, Summary of 2010 Sales and Use Tax Budget Legislation, TSB-M-10(18)S (December 6, 2010) at
2.
In addition, rent subject to the sales tax on occupancy of a room or rooms in a hotel now
includes any service or other charge or amount paid as a condition of occupancy to a
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ILLINOIS VAT
Beginning on March 1, 1984 Illinois required gasoline retailers to prepay three
cents per gallon to their distributor, supplier or other reseller as an advance payment of
the Retailers’ Occupation Tax (ROT). The full amount would be collected from the
customer at the time of a final sale, and reported by the retailer.20 A credit was allowed
against the ROT for prepaid taxes.21 Distributors, suppliers, or other resellers of motor
fuel were required to remit the prepaid ROT monthly.
On July 1, 2003 Illinois changed the prepayment tax rates,22 but the structure of
the tax was unchanged. Gasohol was now taxed at five cents per gallon, and other motor
fuels at six cents per gallon. Certain other fuels were exempt.23
The Illinois ROT in the retail gasoline market works as follows. Assume 10
gallons of any type of gasoline is sold by a refiner (pipeline terminal operator, or
maritime terminal operator) to a wholesaler, then to a distributor, and on to a retailer who
sells to a final consumer. Assume further that the value of this gasoline at retail is $4.00
per gallon. In this case the refiner will collect nothing from the wholesaler, and the
wholesaler will collect nothing from the distributor.
The distributor however, will collect 6 cents per gallon from the retailer (60 cents)
and (a) remit this amount with its monthly return24 and (b) provide the retailer (and the
Department of Revenue) with a statement of the tax paid no later than the 20th day of the
following month.25 The retailer will collect $2.50 from the consumer (10 x $4.00 x
6.25% = $2.50). The retailer’s return will take a credit for 60 cents, and remit $1.90
($2.50 less $0.60 = $1.90).

room remarketer. Accordingly, the full amount charged by a room remarketer to its
customer for the right to occupy a room in a hotel in New York State constitutes rent for
occupancy of a room in a hotel, and is subject to sales tax. Furthermore, since the new
law provides that in these circumstances, a room remarketer is an operator of a hotel, the
room remarketer must collect the sales tax, and where applicable, the fee of $1.50 per
unit, per day imposed in New York City (NYC $1.50 fee) from its customer, and remit
the amount collected to the Tax Department.
20
Prepaid Sales Tax on Motor Fuel Public Act 83-1080 (HB-1133).
21
Illinois Department of Revenue, Information Bulletin FY 84-27 (Feb. 1, 1984)
22
Illinois Department of Revenue, Information Bulletin FY 2004-05 (July 1, 2003)
23
Exemptions applied to majority blended ethanol fuel, 100% biodiesel, and qualifying biodiesel fuel
blends.
24
86 ILL. ADM. CODE §130.551. The form involved in this notification process is the four-part form PST2. Parts A and B are completed by retailers and submitted with tax returns (part A) and kept for records
(part B). The wholesaler will complete a separate form PST-2 and submit part C with the tax return and
keep part D for records. The purpose of this filing is to allow the tax administration to check fuel purchases
and tax payments.
25
35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2d; 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2e
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In spite of this prepayment regime, the Illinois Attorney General indicates that
fraud at the retail level is “pervasive.”26 The Illinois gas tax is not “self-enforcing” (like
a VAT), and the reason is easy to identify:
 The amount of the prepayment (five or six cents per gallon) is less than 20% of
the tax collected on the final retail sale and it is not sufficient to deter fraud.
Unreported (cash) sales27 to consumers28 provide (roughly) a twenty-cent per
gallon “tax profit.”
 The prepaid ROT relies on the accuracy of the distributor’s reporting, but does not
incentivize its accuracy. Gasoline middlemen legitimately make taxable and nontaxable supplies (depending on their customer’s commercial status), and as a
result, incentives develop for the retailer to split-the-profits of the fraud with their
suppliers to secure untaxed gasoline.
When gasoline retailer profit margins are examined it becomes clear why the
ROT is not a “self-enforcing” tax. In 2010 the average (gross) profit margin for gasoline
retailers was 16.9 cents per gallon. In 2009 the margin was 10.3 cents.29 Average selling
expenses reduce this amount between 8 to 12 cents per gallon.30 Thus, in an environment
where profit margins are very thin (2 to 6 cents per gallon) the Illinois “tax margin”31 can
be ten times greater than the “normal” profit per gallon (amounts may vary depending on
whether the gasoline is branded or unbranded, with unbranded margins being higher).32
Because fraud was suspected, the Illinois Attorney General began an investigation
of gasoline retailers in 2008. The investigation has identified over 650 gasoline operators
allegedly involved in cheating on the ROT. If ultimately proven, this would mean that
more that 27% of the gasoline retailers in Illinois engage in tax fraud.33 $54 million in
taxes have been recovered.34

26

Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan cited in: Melissa Harris, Madigan: Tax Fraud Among Gas
Stations Operators is “Pervasive,” Chicago Tribune (Sept. 25, 2011) available at:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-0925-gas-tax-20110925,0,6417746.story
27
There is an assumption that gasoline fraud occurs primarily in cash sales, because credit card transaction
will leave a digital trail.
28
Taking an average self-serve regular price for gasoline in Chicago at $4.00 per gallon, times the 6.25%
tax rate yields a 25 cent per gallon tax. See: CBS Chicago, Once Again Chicago has the Nation’s Highest
Gas Prices (September 12, 2011) (indicating that the average price is $4.02) available at:
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2011/09/12/chicago-once-again-has-nations-highest-gas-prices/
29
NACS Online (National Association of Convenience Stores) First Half of 2010 Shows Strong Profit
Margins for Gasoline Retailers, (July 2, 2010) available at:
http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/News/Daily/Pages/ND0702107.aspx
30
Scott Horsley, Gas Stations Profit from More that Just Gas, NPR (National Public Radio) (June 5, 2007)
(citing average costs per gallon for payroll [4 cents], rent [4 cents] and credit card fees [4 cents]) available
at: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10733468
31
If the 6.25% tax on $4.00 per gallon gasoline is 25 cents, and if a retailer pays the prepayment ROT of 6
cents per gallon, the profits from fraud would be 19 cents per gallon. If the gasoline retailer could secure
supplies without prepayment ROT the profits would be a full 25 cents per gallon. The retailer could “split”
this profit by overpaying for gasoline that was untaxed.
32
Id.
33
Melissa Harris, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, supra26 note 26.
34
Id.
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The statutory response to the Attorney General’s investigation has been to raise
the flat cents-per-gallon rate under the former law to an estimated measure of the full
ROT amount due, determined under an objective valuation methodology. Therefore,
effective January 1, 2011 and continuing every six months thereafter, the Illinois
Department of Revenue will determine the prepayment rate by multiplying the average
selling price of motor fuel in the state (for the previous six months) by 6.25%,35 and
converting this amount to a cents-per-gallon charge. The whole amount will be the
prepayment amount. As Chicago Business notes,
In a bid to stamp out tax evasion, starting in January, gas stations will have
to pay 100% of their estimated sales taxes upfront when they take delivery
of fuel from distributors …36
CONCLUSION
The Illinois statutory response was a mistake. The problem was not the rate of
withholding. The problem was: (a) objective valuation, and (b) limiting the system to
only the distributor and the retailer.
The solution would have been to move to subjective valuation and to extend the
Illinois gasoline ROT throughout the commercial chain. A market-specific tax needs to
deal with the entire market-place as a VAT.
The model to follow, if Illinois is not anxious to say that it follows the EU VAT,
is New York’s Hotel Room Occupancy Tax. Like the EU VAT it is a credit-invoice
VAT37 that subjectively values supplies,38 and it is extended throughout the commercial
chain (of the hotel room marketplace).
Illinois has probably figured out that limiting ROT withholding to distributors is
not a good idea, because it does not eliminate the incentive for fraud. It did not need to
consider the EU VAT or New York’s Hotel Room Occupancy Tax to figure this out. The
same fraud occurs after the rate increase as before. It is just the formal withholding
amount that has changed. The same incentives for fraud are present today, as they have
always been.
35

35 ILL. COMP. STAT. §120/2d(e)
Paul Merrion, Illinois Cracks Down on Gas Cheats, Chicago Business (December 20, 2010) available at:
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20101218/ISSUE01/312189984/illinois-cracks-down-on-gas-taxcheats#axzz18y484aek.
37
Alan Schenk & Oliver Oldman, VALUE ADDED TAX – A COMPARATIVE APPROACH (2007) at 38, defining
the credit-invoice VAT and indicating that it is the dominant VAT model in the world.
The most prevalent method for calculating VAT worldwide is the credit-invoice VAT (or
invoice VAT) that relies on a tax-against-a-tax-methodology. This form of VAT was
established after World War II in Western European countries (countries now members
of the EU). Including the other elements in the description of the credit-invoice VAT, the
EU-style VAT reaches international transactions under the destination principle, imposes
tax on a consumption base, and typically calculates output tax on tax-exclusive prices.
38
Case 230/87, Naturally Yours Cosmetics Ltd. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excises, 1988 E.C.R.
6365 at ¶ 16 (expressly holding that a subjective valuation, not an objective valuation applies in EU VAT,
“… since the basis of assessment is the consideration actually received and not a value estimated according
to objective criteria.”).
36
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Moving to subjective valuation is different. Policy people may need to consider
the how the EU VAT works, or at least look at New York’s Hotel Room Occupancy Tax.
When value is subjectively determined, the tax is based on the price actually
agreed to between the parties. The price placed on the invoice is the value upon which
the tax is determined. This is relatively easy to check, and it fluctuates in tandem with
prices in the retail market.
One of the primary reasons for not adopting objective valuation in VAT is the
amount of effort such a valuation methodology entails. If determining this value were the
obligation of the taxpayer the VAT would be hopelessly complex. There would be issues
about what was the proper “marketplace” where measurements could be taken as well as
issues about gradations in the quality (or quantity) of the supplies involved.
Illinois avoids giving these problems to the business community by assuming
responsibility for the valuation itself. This shifts the burden. It does not solve it. Illinois
values all sales at a retail market level (regardless of the level of the market involved). It
determines that all gasoline in the state has a value equal to the statewide “average retail
price” of a gallon of self-serve unleaded regular. Illinois conducts the valuation studies.
The state performs this measurement, and then holds this value constant for six months.
The better approach is for Illinois to use subjective valuation. This is clear if we
see the Illinois tax as a state experiment with adopting a VAT to solve a serious (but
market-specific) problem with tax fraud.
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